Financial liberalization and financial fragility : the experiences of Chile and Indonesia compared by Herpt, Ingmar van & Visser, Hans
Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometric
Serie Research Memoranda
%.a,  ” .41”
Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility:
The Experiences of Chile and Indonesia compared
Hans Visser
lngmar van Herpt
-7
Research Memorandum 1994-56
December 1994
vrije  Universiteit amsterdam
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND FINANCIAL FRAGIL-
ITY: THE EXPERIENCES OF CHILE AND INDONESIA
COMPARED
Being a slightly revised version of a paper for the workshop on Fhuncial  Development
and Economic Growrk:  T11cot-y  md  Expericnce.s  fhm~ Devc1opin.g  Counrries,  Groningen,
7-9 December 1994
Hans Visser and Ingmar van Herpt
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY: THE EXPERIEN-
CES OF CHILE AND INDONESIA COMPARED
Abstract:
The far-reaching liberalization process introduced in Chile after the overthrow of the Allende regime first
met with reasonable success, but in the early 1980s  a foreign-exchange crisis and a banking crisis appeared
to mark the end of the experiment. Liberalization was resumed in 1985 and has not been plagued by serious
crises since. The root of the problem seems to have been an exchange rate policy which had to be
abandoned, but not before it had led economic actors to make the wren, ~7  decisions. The lack of prudential
supervision of the financial system did the rest. So far, Indonesia has been following much more cautious
exchange rate policies in its liberalization drive. Crises on the scale experienced by Chile are not very likely
to occur. The lessons provided by the lack of prudential supervision in Chile do not, however, seem to have
been taken to heart, or not sufficiently. Even if the Indonesian hanks are unlikely to suffer as much as their
Chilean opposite numbers  from for+n  exchange risks, had loans, in particular resulting from intra-
conglomerate lending, are an increasingly serious prohlzm. In dealing with troubled banks the Indonesian
authorities have not repeated the mistake of the Chileans to provide a full deposit guarantee. Nonetheless,
excellent though the banking rules may look on paper, the implementation leaves much to be desired and
Indonesia probably has not yet seen the end of its bankin,*r troubles. Apparently, market imperfections are
such that effective prudential supervision cannot 1~ dispensed with. Also, it appears that low capital-asset
ratios in both banks and their clients. as in Chile in the mid-1970s,  call for a cautious course in liberaliza-
tion.
1. INRODUCTION
Ever since the early 1970s countries in Asia and Latin America, and to a lesser extent in
Africa, have moved from inward-looking policies with heavy government involvement in
the economy to more outward-looking policies that primarily rely on the price mechanism
rather than on detailed government directives, protection and subsidies. The road to a
more or less free market economy has not always been smooth. The most radical attempt
at liberalization, the Chilean experiment in the late 197Os,  to all appearances foundered in
1982 and it took the Chileans several years to get their liberalization process on course
again. The Indonesian approach by contrast has been much more cautious and so far
major crises have been avoided (though in all fairness it should be noted that Indonesia
only seriously started her liberalization process after the 1982 worldwide debt crisis).
We will first recount the Chilean experience in financial liberalization in the 1973-82
period in order to find out what went wrong and next trace the Indonesian liberalization
process. In the short final chapter, we will try to see what lessons can be learnt from the
Chilean and Indonesian liberalization efforts. Our aim is to discover where Indonesia
avoided the pitfalls which bedevilled the Chilean approach and in what respects, if any,
the Indonesian authorities failed to pay heed to the lessons the Chileans learned the hard
way. The description of the developments in Chile until 1982, with their extreme reliance
on the unfettered functioning of markets, is meant as a kind of benchmark to contrast the
Indonesian experience with .
2Our approach thus is a comparative-historical one. The theoretical arguments in favour
of a market economy and consequently in favour of liberalization are taken for granted.
The transition from a heavily regulated economy to a more market-oriented economy is
fraught with difficulties. Deductive logic does not tell us what transition path is best. In
financial liberalization, much will depend on initial circumstances and on the institutional
framework. Case studies may help to form a mental picture of the various obstacles on
the road to liberalized financial markets and how to deal with them (cf Trebat 1991 p.
66). It may be objected that Chile and Indonesia are very disparate countries and that
comparisons between very different cases are not very useful. If we start, however, from
the premisse that people in different countries and different periods of time react in
similar ways to similar stimuli, it seems that comparative history can teach us useful
things.’ Probably no hard and fast rules can be derived by this method, but it should help
in identiying the areas where liberalization efforts run a serious danger of getting stuck.
2. CHILE’S FINANCIAL LIBERALTZATION
2.1. Chicago Macroeconomics
After the overthrow of President Allende and his Unidad Popular regime in September
1973, the new rulers saw themselves confronted with an economy in severe disorder.
Inflation had exploded under the Unidad Popular, from 22.1 per cent in 1971 to 487.5
per cent in 1972 and 605.9 per cent in 1973 (figures from Edwards 1986 p. 245). The
new government started on a cautiously liberalizing course, but inflation hardly abated
after the change of regime: in 1974 it ran at 369.2 per cent and in 1975 at 343.2 per cent.
Lacking a clear idea of how to run the economy themselves, the military rulers then
turned to the only group with a consistent view of attacking Chile’s economic problems, a
group of predominantly Chicago-trained young economists. These so-called Chicago kids
or Chicago boys took over the management of the economy in 1975 and started to
liberalize the Chilean economy at a fast pace. The extremely protectionist and compli-
cated system of import tariffs and nontariff barrjers  inherited from the Allende ad-
ministration was swiftly dismantled. Nontariff barriers were simply abolished and tariffs,
which had run as high as 1000 per cent or more in September 1973, with a weighted
average of 105 per cent, were reduced to a tlat rate of 10 per cent in June 1979, except
I.  For support we may refer to three other studies on a much larger scale where conclusions are drawn
from a comparison of case studies in the hanking and  finance area: C.P. Kindleberger’s  famous study of
Manias, Panics, a~rd  0trshcs  (Kindlel~er~er  197S), and more recent IMF and World Bank studies, which
are also referred to elsewhere in this paper: V. Sundarar~~jan  and T.J.T. Bali%  (1991),  and S. Faruqi  (ed.)
(1993),  which explicitly has Lm-errs (!f COINJ)OIYI~~IT  Esl,crYorc~~  as a subtitle.
3for cars over 850 cc capacity (cf E111’0177077q~  1978 p. 15; Corbo and de Melo  1987 p.
123). Also, export subsidies and cheap credits for special borrowers were abolished.
The opening-up of the economy went hand in hand with a serious, and ultimately
reasonably successful, attempt to fight intlation. Fiscal tightness (see table 1) and
monetary contraction were introduced. which together with a fall in the price of Chile’s
main export product, copper, led to a sharp reduction in GNP in 1975. At first, the
Chilean government saw the exchange rate as a tool for correcting balance of payments
problems (Euro111o11q  1978 p. 15). Later on, however, the rate of exchange was
primarily deployed to help reduce intlation. In early 1978, the Central Bank extended the
preannouncement of daily exchangtirates  one or two months in advance to a schedule
(rablita)  coverin g the entire year. It was hoped that inflationary expectations would be
revised downwards in this way (Ih4F  1981 p. 339). In June 1979 the Central Bank went
one step further and tixed the dollar exchange rate (Edwards and Edwards 1992 p. 205).
It was, however, not before 1981 that the inflation rate converged to the world inflation
rate of 9.5 per cent. In the process, the real exchange rate (defined such that a higher real
exchange rate means that domestic goods become cheaper vis-a-vis foreign goods)
inevitably fell (cf Visser 1993). The fall in the rate of inflation took much longer than
expected, probably because of backward indexation of wages which prevented production
costs from falling faster, but the capital-import-tinanced boom in the nontradeables sector
will also have played a role (Kiguel and Liviatan 1994 p. 174-5).
What happened can easily be told in terms of the dependent economy model. The
Chilean peso underwent a real appreciation, the current account of the balance of
payments turned into deficit (to the tune of 13.7 per cent of GDP in 1981, see Corbo
1985 p. 906), capital inflows soared and the nontradeable sectors boomed (Corbo and
Sanchez 1985 p.  89). When capital inflows suddenly stopped in 1982 and the fixed
exchange rate could not be maintained, a financial crisis broke out, triggered by bad debts
and high dollar liabilities. Even if the opening-up of the Chilean economy had proven
quite successful, the liberalization of the financial sector that went hand-in-hand with it,
ended in disaster. In the next few sections we will try to find out what went wrong.
2.2. Financial Liberalization
Under President Allende, the financial sector had been nationalized. The allocation of
credit was not based on clear economic criteria. The switch to a market economy
economy which was the overriding policy aim of the Chicago-trained economists under
Pinochet did not stop at the financial system. The liberalization of the financial system
was one of their top priorities. This liberalization included reprivatization of the banking
sector, the lifting of interest ceiling in order to reinstate the market as the allocational
machinery for credit with the real rate of interest as the equilibrating mechanism, and
encouraging the establishment of new banks and other financial institutions.
4year GDP M I M2 inflation deficit eschanne  rate savincs
1 1970 2.1 52 51 34.9 2.9
1971 9.0 99
1972 -1.2 96
1973 -5.6 273
1974 1.0 301
1975 -12.9 233
1976 3.5 213
1977 9.9 165
1978 8.2 88
1979 ,8.3 60
1980 7.5 58
1981’ 5.3 33
1982 -14.1 -5
95 22.  I 11.2
91 487.5 13.5
286 605 .9  24 .6
279 369.2 10.5
301 3 4 3 . 2  2 . 6
290 197 .9  2 .3
225 84.2 1.9
114 37.2 0.9
86 38.0 -1.7
58 31.2 -0.6
89 9.5 -3.0
-15 20.7 -2.3
0.012
0.016
0.025
0.360
1.87
8.50
17.42
27.96
33.95
39.00
39.00
39.00
73.43
21.6
17.8
10.4
9.5
25.3
8.5
15.4
10.7
11.6
13.7
15.5
7.5
GDP = percentage real GDP growth; h41 = percentage growth rate of narrow money; M2 =
percentage growth of broad  money: intlation = intlation percentage December - December; deficit
= government budget d&kit  as a percentage of GDP; exchange rate = pesos per US$, end of
year; savings = gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP.
Sources: real GDP growth from Edwards 1986 p. 243 ,  1982 f r o m  Itrrmrdonnl  Finnncinl
Sfatistics;  money growth from Corbo 1985 p. 896: intlation from Edwards 1986 p.  245; budget
deficit from Edwards 1986 p. 245; exchange rate from Imm~riomd  Firwncid Stnrisrics; savings
from Edwards 1986 p. 257.
Liberalization started already in 1974 with the lowering of reserve requirements and the
permission to establish non-bank financial institutions (NBFI), so-called jkncierus,
which were free of rules as to setting interest rates. In October 1975 the commercial
banks also were freed from restrictions as to interest rates. Between 1975 and 1978
furthermore all the banks, except the Banco de1  Estado and two small banks that were
involved in difficulties of a legal nature, were privatized. The public sector was even
prohibited to invest in the banking sector (Held 1990 p. 177). A number of banks were
sold to conglomerates or g~lpo.s that used the newly acquired banks to finance their own
expansion.
The freedom to set up new banks resulted in an increase in the number of domestic
commercial banks from 18 in September 1973 to 26 in 1981 and in the number of foreign
banks from 1 to 19. A measure of the increase in financial intermediation is the increase
in the total real volume of credit to the private sector over that period by more than 1100
per cent (Edwards and Edwards 1987 p. 56).
2.3. Int.ernational Capital Flows and the Financial Sector
The liberalization of the current account of the balance of payments was not fully matched
by a liberalization of the capital account. Capital controls, in particular controls on
external borrowing by commercial banks, were thought necessary in order not to be
flooded with capital intlows, which would have made control of the money supply that
much more difficult (Sergio de la Cuadra, vice-president of the Chilean central bank, in
Euromon.ey 1978 p. 17). In 1977 the banks were allowed to act as an intermediary for
medium and long-term foreign capital, provided foreign debt did not exceed 5 per cent of
a bank’s capital. In 1979 this restriction was lifted and the only restrictions were that
foreign debt was subject to a capital-asset ratio of 5 per cent and that capital inflows per
bank in any month should not exceed 5 per cent of the bank’s capital (Corbo and de Melo
1987 p. 123). The latter restriction in its turn was lifted in April 1980. Restrictions on
inflows of short-term capital remained in force until 1982.
Apparently, the restrictions on capital inflows were insufficient and what happened is
what McKinnon had already warned against in 1973 (McKinnon  1973 Ch. 11). Domestic
interest rates in Chile rose sharply and exchange rates were believed to remain stable for
a time at least. The restrictions on capital intlows were far too weak to prevent huge
inflows, which reached a peak of no less than some 25 per cent of GDP in the first half
of 1981 and resulted in an inflated nontradeables sector and a rapidly increasing excess
demand in the tradeables sector, i.e., a huge trade deficit (Corbo 1985 p. 903). True,
when capital import restrictions were partially lifted capital intlows at first helped to
reduce real interest rates sharply 1979, but in 1981 they soared again (see Table 2),
probably at least in part because of devaluation expectations (Galvez and Tybout 1985 p.
972.),  but also perhaps because of an unexpected fall in inflation (Corbo 1985 p. 903).
2.4. The Disappointments of Financial Lihemlizstion
Financial intermediation may have undergone multiple expansion, the hoped-for increase
in savings failed to materialize. A plausible explanation is that economic agents an-
ticipated high economic growth and spent heavily on consumer goods. Another contribut-
ing factor is that the revenue of the sales of public sector enterprises was used by the
government to finance current expenditure (Edwards and Edwards 1987 p. 60).
Savings remained at a low level (see Table l), contributing to real interest rates that
rose to dizzying heights. Low savings have been attributed to the rise in asset values in
the boom period of 1978-‘81,  which produced a wealth effect on spending (Corbo and de
Melo  1987 p. 133). There may have been a number of other factors contributing to high
interest rates. First of all, there may have been a high demand for loans by firms
desperate for funds in order to avoid bankruptcy, and those loans were freely given,
especially to firms within the same s1’11p0.  The squeezin,0 of the tradeables sector resulting
Year Outstandinp loans Debts
1976 50.9 8.6
1977 46.1 17.3
1978 35.9 22.6
1979 15.8 4.7
1980 11.6 5.0
1981 33.2 25.5
1982 30.6 20.5
1983 14.9 3.9
1984 11.0 2.6
1985 10.6 4. I
1986 7.4 1.5
1987 9.0 3.1
1988 8.0 2.4
1988 till October. Source: Held 1990 p. 195.
Table 2. Red  intcwst  lntes on  ji,wJ-l-m  30-
89 duy  locms,  1976-1988.
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from the fall in the real exchange rate will
surely have been a contributing factor
(Edwards 1990 pp. 8,9),  but firms already
entered the post-Unidad Popular period
seriously undercapitalized (Corbo 1985 p.
899). Secondly, the real-estate boom that
started with the fixed dollar rate increased
the demand for loans, whereas the rise in
property prices appeared to provide sound
security for lenders (Eyzaguirre 1993 p.
129). Thirdly, people may have been
willing to pay high interest rates because
of devaluation expectations. Both explana-
tions are consistent with the jump in real
interest rates between 1980 and 1981 (see
Table 2; the figures for 1980 do not re-
flect a jump, but they are an average over
the whole year). But they had been high
before already. The actions of the ,fintmietm  did nothing to restrain the rate of interest.
They were subject to fewer restrictions than the banks and paid higher interest rates to
depositors, forcing the banks to follow in their footsteps. High real interest rates made
life difficult for many firms and contributed to the proliferation of bad loans that plagued
the Chilean financial sector. It has been said, probably with good reason, that the high
interest rates resulted in adverse selection, because banks did not make funds available for
low-risk, low-return investments (Corbo and de Melo 1987 p. 137, Mirakhor and
Villanueva 1993 p. 32: the argument stems from Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Ultimately, in
November 1981 the central bank had to step in in order to rescue four banks and four
jkmxiertrs, with between them about one half of the assets of the entire financial system
(Harberger 1986 p. 239).
2.5. Prudential Supervisiorl
In hindsight, it appears that grossly inadequate prudential supervision is at least partly to
blame for the financial crisis that erupted in 1982. Prudential supervision was below par
in several respects (cf. Trebat 1991 pp. 60-  1):
(i) requirements for setting up new banks were anything but strict (see Table 3);
(ii) required capital-asset ratios did not take account of the riskiness of different bank
assets;
(iii) accounting systems were not designed to spot debt accumulation in time;
(iv) there was too little legal room for taking action in a crisis situation.
-.-
7commercial hanks tle~elopnient  hanks financieras
December 1974 2,500,OOO 1200,000 400,000
January 1976 3,900,000 3 ,ooo.ooo
January 1978 4,000,000 3,000,000
September 1980 10,400,000 5.200,000
Augus t  198  1 10.400.000
Amounts in approximate: US dollars equivalents on date  of introduction. Source: Held 1990 p.
227.
These problems were compounded by the absorption of commercial banks by gnlpos.  The
grupos bought many of the privatized companies from the state, including commercial
banks. The government had made an attempt to prevent excessive concentration of
economic power by stipulatin,0 that individuals were not allowed to hold more than 1.5
per cent of a bank’s share capital and companies not more than 3 per cent (Held p. 177).
The government conceded that these rules were circumvented. Moreover, it discouraged
foreign banks from takin g an interest in Chilean banks (Euromoney  1978 p. 29). Non-
financial companies subsequently were not allowed to hold more than 5 per cent of a
bank’s share capital. The grupos, however, managed to circumvent such rules and at the
end of the decade of the 1970s ten big banks, representing 80 per cent of own capital tied
up in banking, were directly controlled by grrlpos (Edwards and Edwards 1987 p. 99).
The banks attracted dollar loans, which they had to pass on without converting them
into pesos. In the three years from 1979 to 1982 the external debt of the banks multiplied
from $660 million to nearly $7 billion (Trebat 1991 p. 62). Other grupo companies,
however, contracted dollar loans from the banks and provided peso credits. Meanwhile,
capital-asset ratios both in financial and nonfinancial firms deteriorated. The government
could have given the right signals in 1977 when a number of financierns  and the Banco
Osorno la Union failed as a result of bad loans to companies within the Fluxa  grupo. It
took a number of steps, such as increasing the required minimum capital for finan.cier~s
and introducing a temporary deposit guarantee to a maximum of $3000 for each depo-
sitor. All creditors of the Ranco Osorno, however, were fully compensated. Economic
agents interpreted this government action as a tle~fbcro  unlimited deposit guarantee and in
their investment policy disregarded the soundness of the financial institutions. Velasco
(1991 p. 140) notes that if deposits had not been perceived to be guaranteed, there would
have been major bank runs, which did not take place. The government was ambiguous in
its statements. Central bank vice-president Sergio de la Cuadra told Euromney in 1978
on the one hand that banks had to function in a free market, with all that this implied, and
8on the other hand that bank failures would  have more serious effects than bankruptcies of
industrial firms (Ez~rmwm~  1978 p. 17). It took the government some years to come to
the conclusion that more strict prudential supervision was called for and in the process it
created a classical case of moral hazard. Moreover, the monetary authorities failed to deal
with the increasingly closer ties between banks and ~q,z~po.r.  Only in 1980 a begin was
made with the classification of outstanding credits according to risk categories and in
1981 the banking superintendent got the right to prohibit some kinds of credits (Held
1990 p. 237). But it was too little too late. In 1981 and 1983, again, banks in trouble
were fully bailed out. The sale of bad debt by the banks to the central bank amounted to
28 per cent of their total assets and 18  per cent of GDP in 1985 (Held p. 260).
2.6. The Aftermath of the Crisis
In early 1983 the government saw itself forced to take over the two largest private
commercial banks, to close down three banks and to intervene in five others (Eyzaguirre
1993 blz. 132). Even if the government had during the build-up of foreign debt since
1980 declared that foreign debt contracted by the private sector was not its concern
(Edwards 1986),  it now helped out troubled firms by selling ‘prefenterial dollars’ at a
subsidized rate after the 1982 devaluation had increased the peso value of foreign debt
and also bailed out the troubled banks that were saddled with bad debts. It had to give in
when, after it had in 1983 reiterated its position, the foreign commercial banks suspended
all credit, including short-term trade credit (hqeller  1992 p. 58). The central bank bought
private banks’ nonperforming portfolios in exchange for promissory notes that bore a real
interest of 7 per cent, whereas the banks were under the obligation to repurchase thair
debt in the future, against a 5 per cent real interest rate. Thus, the central bank subsidized
the commercial banks (Edwards and Edwards 1992 pp. 205, 209; Eyzaguirre 1993 p.
132; see for more details Velasco 1991 p. 157).
The Chilean liberalization effort had foundered, or so it seemed even to well-informed
observers (Corbo  1985 p. 909, Hanson 1986 p. 232). In April 1984 the Chicago-educated
Minister of Finance received his marching orders, and that looked the end of it. In 1985,
however, free-market economists were back at the helm and the Chilean economy ever
since has been held up as a shinin g example of the good that market-oriented policies can
do. The government did not, however, return to the extreme hands-off policy that had
characterized the reign of the Chicago boys (Edwards and Edwards 1992 p. 207).
Monetary policy, for example, was aimed at preventing real interest rates from rising as
exorbitantly as in the pre-1983 period. It is a moot point, however, how much of the
success in keeping real interest rates down was due to monetary policy and how much to
increased supply in the credit market, e.g. as a result of the rise of private pension funds
(Edwards and Edwards 1992 pp. 207-'8).
9Figure 1. The relationship between openness and  seal
Chile, metals and or-es excluded. Source: Wsser 1993.
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The government also had to give up the fixed exchange rate as from June 1982. It
proved possible to depreciate the peso at a much higher rate than the rate of inflation and
over the rest of the 1980s the real exchange rate roughly doubled, which went hand in
hand with a significant rise in exports as a percentage of GDP (see Figure 1’).
It was conceded that prudential supervision had been lax, or rather lacking, and steps
were taken, inter alia,  to introduce risk-weighted capital-asset ratios and reduce the (de
facto) coverage of deposit guarantee, culminating in the 1986 revision of the banking law
(see Ramirez 1991; Eyzaguirre 1993 pp. 136’8).
2.7. Preliminary Conclusions
In the financial climate in the world in 1982 a debt crisis was hard to avoid for any
heavily indebted country, and heavily indebted Chile was: the debt service ration jumped
from 43.1 per cent in 1980 to 71.3 per cent in 1982 (World Bank 1989 vol. 2). By late
1981 the cracks in the Chilean economy had already become visible, in the guise of
nonperforming loans (i.e., loans on which interest had not been paid for at least three
*. Note that the figure  for exports/GDP for 1982  is missing, which gives  the probably wrong impression
that the curve starts already rising sharply in 1982.
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months) and an extremely high real interest rate (see Table 2). Ceilings on foreign
borrowing by banks or higher and more effective required capital-asset ratios would have
resulted in less foreign borrowing. Also, if there had been no indexing of wages, inflation
would probably have fallen faster and the real appreciation of the peso would probably
have been less. Furthermore, there would have been less of a financial crisis if prudential
supervision had been more effective and if the government had not given de facto full
deposit insurance. This gave rise to moral hazard problems and it forced financial
institutions with a prudent loan policy to pay the same high interest rates to depositors as
their more risk-loving brethren.
It took several years before inflation was reduced to single figures. A major contribut-
ing factor was backward wage indexation. Severe shocks of other kinds also hit the
economy, such as the sale of nationalized firms. The macroeconomic instability was thus
compounded by an upward pressure on real interest rates, through an increased demand
for credit meeting with a still restricted supply of savings. It is doubtful whether under
such circumstances it was a wise decision to leave interest rates completely free. As noted
above, it is highly probable that adverse selection took place. Even McKinnon himself,
who started, together with E.S. Shaw, the debate on financial liberalization in 1973, now
argues against lettin g real interest rates rise without limit (McKinnon 1988 pp. 401, 407;
McKinnon 1992 pp. 77-83, see also Villanueva  and Mirakhor 1990 pp. 510, 513).
Apparently, after a shockwise regime change, it may take many years before the
economy, and the financial sector in particular, can be.left  to the discipline of the market.
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3. THE INDONESIAN FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION
3.1. The Underlying Philosophy
year GDP MI M2 inflation hud:et  zxchance r;lte
1966 2.3
1967 2.3
1968 11.1
1969 6.0
1970 7.5
1971 7.0
1972 9.4
1973 11.3
1974 7.6
1975 5.0
1976 6.9
1977 8.8
1978 7.8
1979 6.3
1980 9.9
1981 7.9
1982 2.2
1983 4.2
1984 7.0
1985 2.5
1986 5.9
1987 4.9
1988 5.8
1989 7.5
1990 7.2
1991 6.9
1992 6.4
1993 6.5
764 743
132 140
125 137
58 82
37 42
28 42
49 49
42 43
40 46
35 39
26 31
25 18
34 22
33 35
51 49
3-9 28
10 14
6 32
1 3 22
I8 46
15 6
9 3-3
13 3-4
43 39
16 45
12 17
8 20
920
171
128
IG
12
4
6.5
31
?I
19
20
11
8
21
18.5
12
9.5
12
10.5
4.7
5.9
9.2
8.0
6.5
7.4
9.4
7.5
9.7
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
2.8
1.9
2.3
2.4
2.0
0.9
3.2
I.5
I.0
0.5
0.5
3.4
I.4
3?-.-
1.4
0.6
0.3
2.7
1.0
3.2
2.0
-0.4
-0.4
1761235
2771326
2771326
3401378
3741115
3741415
3741415
415
415
415
415
625
627
626.75
644.0
692.5
994
1074
1125
1641
1650
1731
1797
1901
1992
2062
2110
Sources: GDP growth calculatd  from I/lrc,/./lnrior/nl  Firurrrcicrl  Srcuisrics,  1986-93: from World
Econott~ic  Outlook. October 1994, p. 126 (1993: forecast). Money growth: calculated from
htewtationnl  Firrntrcinl  Smtistiu.  In tlation: calculated from CPI figures  in Internoriomzl  Fimmcial
Statistics. Bud+  deficit tktind  as borrowing rquirement  excludin,0 foreign aid, calculated from
Internntiorml  Fimtlciul  Sttrtisricx.  $  ~s~hanpz  rate: mtl of year. from Iuretwcrtiotml  Fitw~cial  Smtis-
rics,  1967-1973 rates  apply to exports vnd  to imports. re.specti\.c’ly.
Table 4 196692.
The introduction of liberalization in Chile marked an extremely sharp break with the past.
In Indonesia too a regime that had allowed intlation  to rise to around 1,000 per cent was
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replaced by a new group of rulers, but the transition was much less of an earthquake, in
the sense that Indonesia did not develop into a testing ground for a pure version of some
policy approach. After the failed coup of 1965, Suharto assumed power in March 1966 as
a member of a triumvirate and only in h4arch 1968 he succeeded Sukarno as President.
Again, a group of US-educated people, this time from Berkeley, took over the comman-
ding posts in the area of economic policy, though to all appearances this ‘Berkeley
maffia’ got much less of a free hand under President Suharto than their Chicago counter-
parts got under President Pinochet, and they were not such dogmatic laissez-faire
proponents anyway. Even if not motivated by the, for the period, extreme free-market
principles of the Chicago kids, the New Order government nevertheless energetically
attacked Indonesia’s economic problems. The Indonesian economy remained strongly
regulated, but with technical and financial help of the IhdF a Rehabilitation and Stabili-
zation was drawn up and put into practice over the 1966-‘70  period, aimed at reducing
inflation, developing the infrastructure and improving the supply of basic goods and
services. Inflation fell surprisingly fast and economic growth did not suffer under the anti-
inflationary policy. One problem the Indonesians had not to cope with in the first years of
their reign, unlike the Chileans, was a precipitous fall in the price of their main export.
Indeed, the opposite happened: the oil price hike of 1973-4 contributed to a return to
double-digit inflation. However, oil prices did fall in the early 198Os,  and it was felt that
more serious measures were called for to put the economic house in order. Indonesia now
started, ever so cagily, on the path to liberalization (Booth 1992 p. 25).
3.2. Financial Liberalization
The 1980s started with the Indonesian financial system characterized by severe financial
repression. There were hardly any financial institutions outside the commercial banks,
which held 95 per cent of financial assets. The five state-owned commercial banks and
Bank Indonesia, which acted both as the central bank and as a commercial bank, between
them held 80 per cent of all financial assets. The playin g field for the state banks and the
private banks was far from level: state banks had easier access to Bank of Indonesia
credit, were allowed a much more extensive branch network and were the only banks
where public enterprises could hold accounts. Foreign banks were even more disad-
vantaged in that they had no access whatsoever to Bank of Indonesia credit and could not
open more than two branches. Credit allocation was heavily influenced by all kinds of
special programmes.  Subsidized directed credit accounted for 48 per cent of all bank len-
ding in 1982 and this so-callecl  /ic/r/it/it~!  c.~rt/ir  should  be refinanced at low rates by Bank
Indonesia. Indeed, refinancing was the main source of funding for the state banks, as they
were subject to an interest ceiling for deposits of over three months, whereas the private
banks were free to set their own rates. III  1982 state banks paid on average 6.0 per cent
interest on 6-month  deposits, against 18.5 per cent for private banks. Credit allocation
year nominal rate rral ratz
1968 72.0 -24.0
1969 60.0 35.7
1970 24.0 10.4
1971 24.0 19.2
1972 18.0 10.6
1973 15.0 -12.0
1974 15.0 -18.4
1975 15.0 -3.2
1976 15.0 -4.2
1977 12.0 0.9
1978 9.0 0.7
1979 9.0 -9.6
1980 9.0 -8.0
1981 9.0 -2.9
1982 9.0 -0.5
1983 18.0 5.5
1984 18.3 11.1
1985 15.0 12.8
1986 15.0 0.6
1987 17.5 4.7
1988 18.5 9.6
1989 16.5 9.8
The real rate has  lxen  calcul;cted  hy  clctlxtinp
by the CPI of thz currznt  year.
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was also affected by the credit ceilings
imposed by Bank Indonesia on individual
banks (see on all this, as for the rest of
this section, Hanna 1994).
Credit allocation was opaque and inef-
ficient, both in the sense that loans did not
always reach intended beneficiaries (or
that it was even well-nigh impossible to
judge if the allocation met any intention at
all) and in the sense that projects with a
low return were financed. This latter
effect came about through low, subsidized
interest rates and through subsidized credit
insurance from a state-owned insurance
company, which led to moral hazard
problems in that banks had no incentive to
closely monitor a project (Hanna 1994 p.
0
The fall in oil income made it impera-
tive to mobilize domestic savings and
make more efficient use of available finan-
cial resources. A step in the direction of
liberalization was taken in 1983, when
directed credit was substantially reduced
and interest on such credits were increa-
sed. Other interest ceilings were abolis-
hed. Liquidity credits, though, were not
abolished overnight, but were reduced at a
very slow pace: they fell gradually from 37.1 per cent of all bank credit in March 1983 to
11.9 per cent in March 1992 (Hanna 1994 1~.  5). Monetary policy, which until June 1983
had relied on credit ceilings for individual banks, now had to find other instruments. For
lack of sufficient government debt, Bank Indonesia introduced Sert@kcrt  Bank  In.dunessia
(SBI), debt issued by themselves, in order to create paper eligible for open-market
operations. To the same end, Bank Indonesia stimulated the market for bank acceptances
or Slcrut  Berhcrrgo  Pmc~r  UNI?S  (SBPU) (Binhadi 1990 p. 61, Sundararajan and Molho
1988 p. 44, see also Van Herpt, Ruhe and Visser 1994). Bank Indonesia was, however,
handicapped by the shallowness of the market (Woo and Nasution 1989 p.  25).
The next step in financial liberalization again was a reaction to adverse external
developments. 1986 again saw a sharp fall in oil prices. What with the appreciation of the
yen and imports to a large extent coming from Japan, the current account of the balance
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of payments deteriorated and the budget deficit went up. A substantial devaluation (see
Table 4) went hand in hand with a substantial liberalization of international trade. Non-
tariff barriers were replaced by tariffs and those tariffs were then lowered. Also, direct
foreign investment was made easier. Again, there were no sweeping across-the-board
policy changes, but rather a series of measures that followed each other over the years. In
the process, the authorities managed, with the help of fiscal tightening, to keep inflation
in the one-digit range. Then, in October 1988, a set of reforms for the financial sector
was introduced, denoted as PAKTO 27 (the 27 October 1988 package). This included a
drastic lowering of entry barriers into the financial sector. Both domestic and foreign
banks received more opportunities to increase their branch network, state enterprises
henceforth could hold one half of their assets in private banks and both banks and NBFI
were allowed to issue certificates of deposit. Also, the competitiveness of banks relative
to NBFIs  was improved by a reduction in reserve requirements from 15 per cent to 2 per
cent, to which NBFI were now sub-ject  too. Tn order to prevent a sharp credit expansion,
Bank Indonesia required the banks to invest 80 per cent of the funds that became freed
through the reduction in SBIs (Binhadi 1990 pp. 17-18).
Again, liberalization measures were taken in a continuous flow, rather than as a shock
therapy, and PAKTO 27 was followed by three other packages within 15 months. In
March 1989, e.g., absolute limits on foreign borrowing by banks were replaced by a limit
of 25 per cent of equity to the net open position of banks in foreign exchange. Banks
could, under this rule, freely borrow abroad as Ion,0 .as they lent domestically in foreign
exchange. January 1990 saw a further reduction in directed credit, with a reduction in the
numver of priority programmes  and interest rates set closer to market levels. The
subsidized credit insurance was abolished. Against this, banks were required to make 20
per cent of their loans to small borrowers.
3.3. Internationnl  Capital Flows
The capital account of Indonesia was liberalized in 1970 already. Capital flows were
liberalized, with the exception of direct foreign investment and portfolio investment
through the domestic capital market (Sabirin 1993 p. 153). For the rest, restrictions were
abolished, mainly because the government had little hope that it could effectively monitor
and control capital tlows  (Cole and Slade 1992b  p. 122). However, out of a concern
about liquidity growth it imposed ceilings for foreign borrowing by banks and nonbank
financial institutions (NBFI) in 1974, which remained in force until 1989 (Sabirin 1993 p.
154). It is curious that a repressed financial system, with real interest rates often negative
over the 1973-1983 period, and an open capital account could go together. It has been
suggested that capital tlows  were not one-way traftic.  Both banks and non-bank firms
deposited inactive balances abroad, whereas firms that were hit by domestic credit limits
borrowed abroad (Cole and Slade 1992a pp. 86-7). A contributing factor was the credibil-
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ity of the exchange-rate policy, with a tixed dollar exchange rate since 1971. Because of
booming oil exports the current account of the balance of payments did not suffer too
badly from the fall in the real exchange rate that occurred as Indonesia still had double
digit inflation until 1977. In 1978 the rupiah devalued, possibly with an eye to increasing
employment in the export industries, which had suffered from Dutch disease phenomena
(Woo and Nasution 1989 p. 26). The dollar link was replaced by a link with a basket
made up of the currencies of the main trading partners. Bank Indonesia now opted for a
gradual depreciation. The 1978 devaluation came as quite a shock, but seems, if anything,
to have stimulated foreign borrowing, because further steep devaluations were thought to
be very unlikely. Non-oil exports reacted very positively to the devaluation and the
government let the rupiah depreciate gradually vis-a-vis  a currency basket.
One wonders why, with financial liberalization and real interest rates shooting up, no
massive capital intlows followed. One cause probably was the failure of the state oil
company Pertamina to refinance $400 million short-term debt, which prompted the
government to require the state companies to ask permission from the Ministry of Finance
and Bank Indonesia before borrowing abroad. Woo and Nasution (1989 pp. 86-7) see the
Pertamina crisis as a blessing in disguise, as it may well have been a main factor in
saving Indonesia from the fate that met Chile in the 1982 developing country debt crisis.
Other contributing factors were the limits on foreign borrowing by banks and NBFI and
the fact that only very few nonfinancial firms were able to borrow abroad. The authorities
had kept budget cleficits  small and there had been no runaway money growth through
foreign borrowing (as the Pertamina case shows, perhaps more from luck than from
design). The exchange rate policy had prevented a serious overvaluation of the rupiah and
exports were healthy enough service the foreign debt when oil prices took a tumble in the
early 1980s. Also, Indonesia was favourably  placed compared with the Latin American
countries in that suffered much less from the dollar appreciation, only about one third of
her debt being denominated in dollars against some 90 per cent for countries such as
Mexico or Brazil (Woo and Nasution 1989 p. 30). Also, much of its debt was on
concessional terms. Nevertheless, in 1982 the current account ran into deficit to the tune
of 6 per cent of GDP (Woo and Nasution 1989 p. 107) and capital outtlows increased as
a result of increased deval\lation  expectations. Finally, in March 1983 a 38 per cent
devaluation was put through.
In 1989 the limits on foreign borrowing by banks were abolished, but as banks were
too eager to borrow abroad new contraints  were put in place, this time in the guise of a
limit to the net foreign liabilities of a bank and a limit of 30 per cent of own capital for
short-term borrowing (Binhadi 1993  pp. 13-14). Borrowers also had to queue. More or
less free capital tlows force the authorities to follow credible policies. Fear of devalua-
tions had led to speculative capital outtlows  in 1987 and 199 1 and it was decided that
henceforth no sizeable  deval[iations  would take place. Since 1989 the exchange rate is left
I' .- -
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to market forces, with Bank Indonesia intervening only to prevent sharp fluctuations (Van
Herpt, Ruhe and Visser 1994 p. 150).
The large debt accumulation by In-
donesia in the 1980s was to a large part a
result of borrowing by the government
itself. The political elite that took over
after the Sukarno era imposed a constitu-
tional prohibition of domestic debt finan-
ce. The state therefore was dependent on
foreign capital to finance its deficits,
which averaged roughly 2.5 per cent of
GNP over the 1970s and 1980s. The
rulers acted out of fear of inflation, but
one wonders if they did not realize that
foreign-financed deficits swell the money
supply as much as domestic credit from
the banking sector. The idea probably was
that foreign funds were mainly used for
development projects with a high import
component. But the private sector also
borrowed abroad, and the debt-service
ratio shot up when Indonesia was hit in
1986 by a fall in oil prices and a deprecia-
yi%?r ratio
1980 13.9
1981 14.1
1982 18.2
1983 20.2
1984  21 .4
1 9 8 5  2 8 . 8
19%  3 7 . 3
1 9 8 7  3 7 . 0
1 9 8 8  4 0 . 2
1 9 8 9  3 5 . 4
1990  31 .0
1991  32 .6
1992  32 .1
Source: Work1  Dchr Trrkles  1989-1990. vol.  2,
Washington, D.C.: World Bank 1989 entl
World Debt Tnhles 1993-1994, vol. 2. \Vash-
ington, D-C.:  World Bank 1993.
tion of the dollar vis-A-vis the yen. Exports were largely paid in dollars, whereas imports
to a much greater percentage were in yen and debt also was to a large degree yen-
denominated. The current-account deficit of 1982 was met by a devaluation but at the
same time by increasing protection. The 1986 near-crisis turned the tables in favour of the
more free-trade oriented technocrats centered in the Ministry of Finance and Bank
Indonesia. A 50 per cent devaluation combined with trade liberalization helped non-oil
exports to steeply increase over the next few years, reducing the debt-service ratio again.
3.4. The Results of Financial Libclnlization
The liberalization measures taken in 1983 and 1988 and after have had a great impact on
the banking scene, just as Finance Minister J.B. Sumarlin  had expected. His policy
objective was to vitalize the commcercial banks. Competition by these banks would force
the state-owned banks to improve efficiency and the whole banking system would function
with fewer market imperfections. The number of national private banks doubled from 63
to 126 between 1988 and 199 1. The branch network of those banks even increased from
559 to 2639, against a small rise from 815 to 960 for the tive state banks and a jump
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from 21 to 53 for foreign banks and joint ventures (Bank Indonesia 1992 pp. 108-9).
Lending ballooned. Whereas total lending rose by 109 per cent, the domestic commercial
banks saw their lending soar by 290 per cent and the foreign banks and joint ventures by
345 per cent, which resulted in a fall of the state banks’ market share from 65.1 per cent
to 52.7 per cent (Bank Indonesia 1992 pp. 38-9).
In the scramble for market share, the banks seem to have been less than prudent. As in
Chile, huge sums were lent to finance real-estate investment and to intra-conglomerate
firms. Also, consumer credit rose sharply. Combined with an anti-inflationary restrictive
monetary policy, high real interest rates have been the result. If the private banks became
saddled with bad and nonperforming loans as a result of this fast expansion plus high
Figure 2. Real exchange mte uncl  espods  OJ munr~irctlrres,  lmtouesiu  IY7U-YU.  See
end of paper for note on the ronstruction  of RER.
interest rates, the state banks got their fair share of troubles from politically-influenced
credit allocation (the kcrrohclccc  or memo system). The plight of the state banks was such
that the World Bank had to provide a $307 million loan which the Ministry of Finance
used to recapitalize them. It seems, however, that 15 to 20 times this amount is needed to
fully recapitalize them, accorcling to World Bank calculations (Sender 1993a  p. 76).
i-9 7 0 1915 19  2: 199-O
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The private commercial banks were not unaffected either. In September 1990 the Board
of Directors of Bank Duta was forced by Rank Indonesia to resign after it had become
known that foreign-exchange transactions had cost the bank $419.6 million, or twice its
capital, in one year. There are signs of behind-the-scene manoeuvring which put a big
question mark over the levelness of the playin g field and the public availability of
information in Indonesian banking. First of all, the foreign-exchange losses imply a level
of foreign-exchange transactions far in excess of official limits. Then, Bank Duta was
back on its feet in a remarkably short time, after a large capital injection from large
shareholders in the form of gifts, the source of which remains somewhat mysterious. It
has been suggested that Bank Duta is at least politically strong (Soesastro and Drysdale
1990 p. 21). Another shock was the failure of Bank Summa in December 1992, as a
result of real-estate loans and loans to low-quality borrowers, in particular intra-conglo-
merate  loans. The attempts by the Soeryadjaya  family, the main owners of the Summa
Group of which Bank Summa formed part, to save Bank Summa from the proceeds of the
sale of healthier parts of the Summa Group came to grief (though in the end all depositors
with a deposit below Rp 10 million were fully compensated). This sent quite a shock
wave to the financial community, as it had always been thought that conglomerates were
strong enough to save their banks if these landed in trouble.
3.5. Prudential Supervision
In PAKTO 27, attention was also paid to prudential supervision, with limits to the volume
of lending to any individual person, firm or conglomerate. Other measures followed. In
March 1991, e.g., prudential supervision was made more comprehensive, with, inter alia
bank directors having to meet professional standards, restrictions as to the number of
relatives of shareholders in the Board of Directors and to the loans to shareholders, limits
as to foreign-exchange exposure and the adoption of the Basle Agreement risk-weighted
capital-asset ratios foreseen for the end of 1993 (later extended to 1994) (Parker 1991 p.
31).
All these measures look fine on paper, but it appears that something is lost in the
execution. Rules can be circumvented, e.g. by granting a loan from a bank’s pension fund
instead of by the bank itself, and apparently supervision often lacks bite, pointing to a
lack of political power of the monetary authorities. This played a role when in mid-1992
the Ministry of Finance replaced all state bank president, with the exception of the
president of Bank Bumi Daya, even if Bank Bumi Daya  was one of the greatest problem
banks (Sender 1993a  p. 76). Apparently in the Indonesian political culture it is well-nigh
impossible to stamp out the knrahclc~  system. One scandal follows another and Finance
Minister Mar’ie Muhammad estimated the volume of non-performing loans at 21.2 per
cent of the state banks’ outstanding credit (\/IcBeth  1994 p. 25).
1 9
Against this, the monetary authorities made it clear at the time of the Bank Summa
debacle that they did not stand ready to rescue troubled banks or guarantee their debts
(Sender 1993b p. 77). Furthermore, under the new Bank Law of Febuary 1992 insuf-
ficient information from the side of the banks can be punished with two years in jail
and/or a Rp 1 billion fine, and bank activities that are not allowed by the law carry the
threat of a 15year  term in jail and/or a Rp  10 billion tine (h4cLeod  1992 pp. 119-122).
But even if such measures may help to reduce moral hazard problems and bring down the
number of cases of violations of the law, other attempts at shoring up the financial system
are half-hearted. State banks. e g., may uncler the new Banking Law issue shares,
provided the state retains a majority share. The state banks can in this way try to attract
new capital, in order to meet the capital-asset ratios as prescribed by the BIS. Now state
bank shares do not look like an attractive investment, given the prevalence of bad loans,
and Bank Indonesia subsequently redefined the rules in such a way that the banks, first of
all the state banks, have less trouble meeting the capital-asset norms McLeod 1993).
3.6. Preliminary Conclusions
Indonesia has not followed a straight course in its liberalization attempts. Policies seem to
have been the outcome of a tug-of-war between various groups, in particular the &ch.-
nocrm,  including the Rerkeley maffia, who favour liberal policies, and the rechnicinns,
such as Technology R4inister Habibie, who are backed by the army and want to develop
high-tech industries, even if that requires stiff protection (cf Woo and Nasution 1989 p.
22). In some markets - cars come to mind - high protection appears to have been the
result of ordinary rent-seeking. Abrupt policy turnabouts on the scale that Chile ex-
perienced never took place in Indonesia. Its exchange-rate policy was not used to restrain
inflation, but in so far as it was deliberately used as a policy tool, it was deployed as a
means to further non-oil exports, with remarkable success. A n  element of luck seems also
to have been involved, especially as regarcls  the 1982 LDC debt crisis, which left
Indonesia relatively little harmed as she happened to have stumbled into the right kind of
restraints on capital intlows and hacl relatively little dollar-denominated debt. On the other
side of the ledger, the financial system appears to be quite fragile, not because of
deficient legislation but because of lax implementation of the law. Good laws do not
always make good supervision. Also, foreign debts might throw up problems as soon as
export growth is interreputed for whatever reason, though, considering the development
of the debt-service ratio, there is no need to start the alarm bells ringing unless a very
large shock occurs.
It may be remarked that Indonesia did not follow the conventional wisdom on liberali-
zation in that the capital account was liberalized before the current account. Capital
liberalization, however, did not amount to full freedom. there was no hands-off policy
and the authorities intervened whenever things might get out of hand. Also, the ruling
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elite was, and is, not unanimous on the merits of current-account liberalization. Anyhow,
high oil export revenues enabled the authorities to substantially liberalize the capital
account before the current account. Foreign-exchange crises have been avoided, at least in
part by following a prudent exchange-rate policy, i.e., by preventing the real exchange
rate falling too much. With relatively low intlation, positive real interest rates and
generally little fear of sharp devaluations, domestic financial assets remained attractive
and wealth holders had little reason to resort to capital flight. Financial liberalization
combined with restrictive macroeconomic policies has led to very high real interest rates,
but the situation might have been worse had not the authorities waited five years after the
1983 liberalization to remove entry restrictions into the banking industry. This gave banks
some breathing space in which to adjust their portfolios and prepare their personnel for a
more market-oriented way of operating (see on this Caprio,  Atiyas and Hanson 1993 73-
4).
4. WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROhI  A COh,IPARISON?
At first sight, Indonesia seems to have put the cart behind the horse in liberalizing its
capital account before its current account. Rut there was no quasi-unrestricted freedom as
in Chile in 1979-82. So both the Chilean and the Inclonesian experience with liberalization
seem to suggest that full freedom of capital tlows  is something that should not be a
government’s first priority, at least the authorities should carefully monitor the capital
account. Free capital intlows  in times of a domestic boom can all too easily be used to
finance real-estate investments which push up the relative price of nontradeables and leave
the country without enough means to service its debt once capital imports dry up. A
relatively free capital account is possible if a country does not suffer from serious
macroeconomic instability. In particular, exchange-rate policy and domestic inflation
should not contlict.
This brings us to another lesson, SC. that a liberalizing country should not use the
exchange rate as the main weapon in the fight against intlation, except perhaps for short
periods. Both Chile after 1982 and Indonesia provide convincing evidence that inflation
can be effectively fought through restrictive domestic macroeconomic policies and that it
is possible to engineer a real depreciation. In other words, it is possible to depreciate the
domestic currency without provokin g a corresponding intlation. It is true that the present
Argentinian policy seems to give the lie to this conclusion, but in the first place it was
supported by strong and credible restrictive macro-economic policies and by structural
policies aimed at breaking up monopolies, and secondly one wonders how long they will
be able to hold out, given the real appreciation that has taken place and the increasing
current-account deficits. It is a high-risk policy, but so far it has been remarkably
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successful (see Schweikert 1994, who can hardly believe his eyes either; see for a more
positive appraisal of exchange-rate-based stabilizations Kiguel and Liviatan 1994).
A common experience has been financial fragility after financial liberalization.
Apparently markets are far from perfect and prudential supervision is of the essence. The
main problems seem not to lie in devising appropriate laws and regulations, but in
implementing them. Also, it may take time to develop the necessary human capital in the
banking industry. There also appears to be a, largely unmet, need for risk management
systems (Caprio,  Atiyas and Hanson 1993 p. 77). A capital mistake in the Chilean case
was the de facto full deposit guarantee provided by the government. The Indonesian
government may have sent the right signals to the market in the nick of time, but the
memo system, or old tie network, is still prevalent. Presumably private banks can more
easily resist this kind of pressure than state banks, at least it is easier for the government
to deny private banks an implicit full deposit guarantee and thus subject them to the
discipline of the market. Of course, a deposit guarantee system with premiums geared to
the riskiness of a bank’s assets would be a good thing.
McKinnons  advocacy of financial liberalization has been generally accepted, but full
liberalization in one fell sweep may rock the boat too severely, as McKinnon  himself
acknowledges. High real interest rates lead to adverse selection; low-risk borrowers are
driven from the market. If the solvability of the financial sector and non-financial firms is
weak to start with, severe shocks can be very dangerous. The financial system may well
be the weak spot in any economic transition or regime change, and it should be given a
number of years to adjust itself. Indonesia was wise in waiting for five years after
liberalizing interest rates before it liberalized entry into the banking industry. This may
have been one factor in preventing real interest rates rising as high as in Chile. Prevent-
ing too severe shocks to the financial sector probably is more important than the sequen-
cing of liberalization. Liberalization of the capital account before liberalization of the
current account proves to be quite possible provided the real exchange rate can be
prevented from falling too much.
When comparing Chile and Indonesia, one thing that strikes the eye is the very
dogmatic hands-off policy followed by the Chicago economists. To let the market sort
things out is irresponsible when it is clear to everybody that the exchange-rate policy is
bound to founder and that the financial industry is heading for trouble. A government
should send unambiguous signals to the market, but it must be flexible enough to adjust
its policies if economic indicators take a turn for the wrong.
Finally, a very general lesson may be that after a severe shock, such as the transition
from the chaotic government interference under the Unidad Popular government (see
Visser 1980) to an extreme free-market economy in Chile, and even more after a
transition from a socialist economy to a market economy, complacency as to the stability
of the financial system is completely out of place.
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NOTE. The Real Exchanpz RatE: of Intlonrsia  in Figure 2 uas  calculatetl  as follows. Only trade with the
main trade partners, Japan. the  US.4 and Singapore w8s  condzred. From imports from and exports to
these countries for 1970. 1975. l9SO.  19S5  anti  1090 average  trade  weights were calculated, summing to 1,
which then were applied to thr GDP cktlator?;  to calculate the avuage  intlation rate of Indonesia’s trade
partners. From the nominal exch:tngr r;tte  and  the  Intlon~sian  GDP detlator the RER follows.
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